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UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY: CONTRACT OR
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?
VICTOR C. ROMERO*
All nations distinguish between their citizens and others. In the United
States, the primary set of laws for determining these distinctions is found in
our immigration policy. The term "immigration law" refers to a rather nar-
row set of rules covering essentially two aspects of a non-citizen's stay in the
United States: first, those rules that govern when that non-citizen may enter,
and, second, those that dictate when she must leave. The whole of United
States immigration law and policy relates to either of these two topics.
Although it may be tempting to think of immigration law as primarily
involving human rights because it regulates the movement of migrants, it is
perhaps more accurate to view it as a form of contract law between the Unit-
ed States and the foreigner. The United States grants the non-citizen the
privilege to enter the country for some specific purpose and amount of time,
and, in exchange, the non-citizen promises to abide by the terms the country
sets forth. Should the non-citizen breach her promise, she must leave the
United States.
The United States government consists of three branches-the legisla-
ture, the executive, and the judiciary--each of which plays a role in deter-
mining what the immigration laws mean, or, in keeping with the contract
analogy, what responsibilities the state and the non-citizen have under the
immigration contract. As the lawmaking body within our federal govern-
ment, Congress has the responsibility for drafting the terms of the immigra-
tion contract between the United States and the non-citizens who seek entry.
Like other federal laws, the terms of the contract are then executed and en-
forced by the President through administrative agencies, such as the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, which promulgate specific regulations to en-
force the broad terms of Congress's immigration policy. The United States
Supreme Court, along with the lower federal courts, is charged with making
sure that the terms of the contract are fairly enforced. In sum, Congress es-
tablishes the broad terms of the immigration contract, the President creates
rules enforcing those terms, and the United States Supreme Court ensures
that those terms are fair.
In reviewing our constitutional immigration history, it is clear that the
United States Supreme Court has primarily taken a back seat in the develop-
ment of the law, allowing Congress and the President to shape immigration
policy in ways that reinforce the idea that immigration law is essentially a
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contract and not a human rights policy, and that non-citizens are subject to
restraints on their presence in the United States in ways that citizens are not.'
At first blush, privileging United States citizens over foreigners makes
intuitive sense. Any sovereign nation should be able to set terms by which
visitors enter and remain on grounds which are inapplicable to those who are
already full members of the polity. On the other hand, the history of con-
gressional immigration policy is fraught with racial and ideological discrimi-
nation largely unchecked by the courts.2 The underlying idea here is that
Congress is in the best position to set the terms of a non-citizen's sojourn in
America; an unelected federal judiciary should not second-guess the will of
the people as embodied in democratically-enacted immigration policy.
While perhaps sound in principle, the historical legacy of court deference to
the legislature has had profound effects in our current time, as the United
States seeks to determine what immigration policy would best suit a nation
embroiled in a foreign war and whose citizens live in the shadow of Septem-
ber 11, 2001. 3
Much of the xenophobia that has gripped our post-9/11 world has its
roots in the colonial period before the nation's founding.4 Whether escaping
religious persecution or seeking better economic circumstances, many Euro-
pean arrivals to the New World brought their cultural baggage along with
them, as the displaced Native Americans and imported African slaves soon
found out. But the conquerors' prejudices also included nativist bigotry, as
the Europeans often settled in ethnic enclaves, each group sticking to its
own.5 It should come as no surprise, for instance, that Germantown, Penn-
sylvania began as a village of Germans transplanted from the Old World in
1683.6 The tendency to prefer things familiar, and to demonize the foreign,
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1. Michael J. Wishnie, Introduction: Immigration and Federalism, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. Am. L. 283, 286 (2002).
2. See generally ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 3-26 (2004).
3. Wishnie, supra note 1, at 284.
4. DANIELS, supra note 2, at 6-9.
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA 19 (1990).
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found its way into local anti-immigration policies that excluded certain reli-
gious groups and social classes, such as the Quakers and Catholics.7
After independence in 1776, Congressional forays into immigration pol-
icy were confined largely to naturalization measures, but otherwise foreign-
ers enjoyed an "open door" to the United States for about one hundred
years. 8 This early laissez-faire attitude toward immigration was born less of
national largesse than of a lack of clarity as to who should have control over
immigration, the thirteen states or the federal government.9 Then, as now,
while the national government ultimately decided when and how a foreigner
became a United States citizen, it was the states that felt the immediate im-
pact of the non-citizen's migration. Because the fledgling nation was grow-
ing rapidly, the United States government was less concerned with limiting
immigration than were the individual states, which viewed immigration con-
trol as but another manifestation of their reserved power. 10 Thus, in contrast
to states' wariness, the first federal legislation passed during this early period
was An Act to Encourage Immigration in 1864.11
This tension between the federal and state governments over the power
to limit foreign migration was understandable given the new Constitution's
lack of clarity. For instance, while Article I, Section 8 specifically granted
power to Congress "to establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization" and
"to regulate Commerce with foreign [n]ations," nowhere in Article I or else-
where did the federal government have specific power to pass general immi-
gration laws regulating the flow of foreigners from abroad. 12 Because the
founders understood that the federal government was one of limited power,
the states continued to be most interested in regulating immigration, not only
because they thought that this was reserved to them under the Constitution,
Whereas one generalizes about migration from Europe, from England, and from Italy going to
the New World, to the American Colonies, and to the cities of the northeastern United States,
the fact of the matter is that migration often follows more precise patterns, often from a particu-
lar region, city, or village in the sending country to specific regions, cities, or even specific city
blocks in the receiving nation.
Id. The first major German migration in 1683, for instance, resulted because villagers from
Krefeld decided to move en masse to establish what is now Germantown, Pennsylvania. Id.
For a more complete account of United States historical immigration legislation briefly de-
scribed below, see generally DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL (5th ed. 2005).
7. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 2.
8. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972).
9. See DANIELS, supra note 2, at 9; WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 4.
10. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 4.
11. Edith Abbott, Federal Immigration Policies, 1864-1924, 2 U.J. Bus. 133, 133 (citing
Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 246 Stat. 385 (1864)).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The word "migration" appears once in Article I, Section 9,
but only in connection to the slave trade. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
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but also because they were most likely to feel the impact of a large immi-
grant influx. And so, it is perhaps unsurprising that Founding Father Benja-
min Franklin, himself an immigrant, was concerned about the influx of Ger-
man Catholics into his native Pennsylvania, just as many Californians and
Arizonans today are concerned about the large migration of Latin Americans
into the desert southwest.
Between 1820 and 1880, large numbers of German and Irish Catholics
arrived in the United States to escape the European economic depression of
the time, and, in turn, some predominantly Protestant states passed laws in an
attempt to stem the tide of Catholic migration. 13 This nascent anti-immigrant
movement proved unsuccessful at the federal level due to the aggregate po-
litical strength of the Irish and German migrants nationally.
Over time, this brewing conflict between federal and state power over
immigration came to a head. The United States Supreme Court stepped in to
resolve this dispute, ruling against the states and paving the way for Con-
gress to begin to craft a uniform immigration policy for the nation. 4 Follow-
ing the United States Supreme Court rulings in The Passenger Cases15 and
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 6 finding state immigration laws unconsti-
tutional, Congress enacted the first general federal restrictions on immigra-
tion law in 1882, which included a fifty-cent head tax and exclusionary laws
based on criminal and economic grounds. 7 While this first set of restrictions
did not single out any particular ethnic group for exclusion, the nativist sen-
timents that led to state laws against Catholic immigration found expression
in a more particular piece of federal legislation that year. 1
Later in 1882, Congress enacted immigration restrictions reminiscent of
the states' recent anti-Catholic pronouncements, when it passed the Chinese
Exclusion Act.' 9 First brought in to work on the westward expansion of the
railroads, Chinese laborers fell into disfavor once they reached a critical
13. DANIELS, supra note 2, at 9-11.
14. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875); The Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1844).
15. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1844).
16. 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
17. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1883). See also Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1, 103-08 (2002).
18. Victor C. Romero, Expanding the Circle of Membership by Reconstructing the
"Alien": Lessons from Social Psychology and the "Promise Enforcement" Cases, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 9 (1999).
19. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
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mass and the work was completed.2 ° Unlike the religious and ideological
divide that separated the Anglo-Saxon Protestants from the Irish and German
Catholics, the growing distrust of the Chinese appeared more racial and cul-
tural in origin. 21 Because no large ethnic voting block protected the Chinese
as it did the Catholics, Congress handily passed the Chinese Exclusion Act to
prevent a further influx.22
One such worker adversely affected by the law was Chae Chan Ping. A
twelve-year resident of the United States, he had permission from the gov-
ernment to visit China, for which he received a certificate of return for pres-
entation upon his reentry.23 At the border, however, federal officials revoked
Chae Chan Ping's certificate and excluded him from reentering the United
States under the Chinese Exclusion Act.24 Before the United States Supreme
Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,5 Chae's lawyers argued that
Congress could not unilaterally revoke his permit to briefly travel abroad.26
The Supreme Court flatly rejected that argument, holding that as a sovereign
nation, the United States has the unilateral prerogative to make immigration
policy as it sees fit, and noting that non-citizens enjoy no right to be in the
country.27 The Court then ruled that Congress had the power to exclude
Chae because he was a member of a group, the Chinese, whom Congress had
deemed to be undesirable.28 Its rhetoric regarding the unassimilable nature
of the Chinese and the implication that they presented a threat to the United
States even during peacetime, evinces the xenophobia first evident in pre-
colonial restrictions on migration:
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and
20. Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1,4(2000).
21. See id.
22. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 6, at 5-7.
23. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889). Hiroshi Motomura sees
Chae Chan Ping as supporting the idea that our immigration policy operates like contract law.
See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2006) ("Chae Chan Ping's case is a prime example of
the view of immigration that I am calling immigration as contract.").
24. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
25. Id. at 581.
26. See id. at 584.
27. See id. at 606-07.
28. Id. at 607-09.
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security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no
actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.29
Four years later in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,3 ° the Court extended
its holding in Chae Chan Ping by concluding that, incident to its plenary
power over immigration law, Congress also had the power to deport or ex-
pel.31 Perhaps even more disturbing than the rule the Court announced is
that Fong's deportation came about as a result of his failure to come up with
a "credible white witness" to testify to the length of his residence in the
United States.3 2 While Chinese nationals were ready to testify to Fong's
continuous residence in the United States as the statute required, Fong was
unable to secure such testimony from a white witness, perhaps owing to bar-
riers created by culture and language, if not by racism. 33 The Court found
the "white witness" requirement to be neither irrational, nor a denial of due
process, deferring to Congress's judgment on the desirability of Chinese mi-
gration and the terms under which Chinese nationals must leave the United
States.34 This privileging of the white witness in Fong Yue Ting mirrors the
xenophobia of the Chinese people's inability to assimilate in Chae Chan
Ping.
35
While good reasons support the Court's deferral to Congress in both
Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, these are easily overshadowed by the
racism afoot in both opinions. On the one hand, the structure and functions
of the Constitution suggest that Congress, and not the Court, should be in
charge of formulating immigration law and policy because it is the lawmak-
ing body of the federal government. This exclusive power of Congress over
immigration law came to be known as the "plenary power doctrine"-to wit,
that as the legislative organ of the federal government, Congress has the sole
right to determine what laws govern the entry and exclusion of those persons
who are not citizens of the United States.36
On the other hand, the very structure of the Constitution requires that
the Court stand vigilant in making sure that Congress does not abuse its ple-
nary power and that its immigration policies are fundamentally fair to non-
citizens. Put another way, the Court has the responsibility for reviewing
29. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
30. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
31. Id. at 728.
32. Id. at 729.
33. Id. at 703-04.
34. Id. at 729-30.
35. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729-30; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
595 (1889).
36. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731.
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legislative action when it appears that the terms of Congress's contract with
the non-citizen violate a central constitutional truth. In a case decided just a
few years before Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, the Court held in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins37 that San Francisco could not discriminate against Chinese
nationals by denying them permits to operate laundries solely on the basis of
their race.38 Invoking the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, the Court
concluded that a local government could not make race a factor in determin-
ing how to enforce the terms of a municipal ordinance.39 To do so would
treat Chinese non-citizens and others unequally under a law that was de-
signed not to limit immigration to the United States, but to regulate the safety
of laundries in San Francisco.
40
In contrast to Yick Wo, the Court in both Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue
Ting failed to place a check on Congress's power over immigration law by
allowing it to make race and national origin factors in determining whether
these foreign workers could remain in the United States.4 In Chae Chan
Ping, it was the plaintiffs foreignness alone that made it permissible for
Congress to renege on its promise to readmit him into the country,42 while in
Fong Yue Ting, it was the Chinese man's failure to find a white witness that
led to his deportation.43
The secret to reconciling these seemingly disparate cases-Yick Wo fa-
voring the non-citizen versus Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting favoring
the government-lies in understanding the separate roles the federal and
state governments play with regard to immigration policy. As we saw ear-
lier, the Court in the late nineteenth century struck down state immigration
laws, and once Congress started enacting its own restrictive migration poli-
cies, the Court affirmatively approved these. 4 This guidance by the Court
made clear that while both the state and federal legislatures may want to re-
37. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In a forthcoming essay, Jack Chin claims that Yick Wo was
actually not too remarkable as an equal protection case, but was rather a property-rights case
consistent with existing precedent. Gabriel J. Chin, Abstract, Unexplainable on Grounds of
Race: Doubts about Yick Wo (U. of Ariz., Paper No. 07-30, 2007),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1075563. Specifically, he claims that it
narrowly stands for the proposition that treaty obligations to the Chinese trumped the state's
ability to regulate against them. Id.
38. YickWo, 118 U.S. at374.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 362-63.
41. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See also Fong Yue Ting,
149 U.S. at 698.
42. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
43. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 729.
44. See id. at 731; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610-11; Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374; see
also supra notes 11-28 and accompanying text.
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strict immigration, the Constitution has given that power to Congress, not the
states.45 Even though San Francisco's laundry ordinance in Yick Wo did not
purport to restrict immigration, observers saw it as an attempt to discriminate
against Chinese nationals, something which the city, as a state municipality,
could not do.46 Such laws that indirectly seek to influence immigration by
directly targeting non-citizens have come to be known as "alienage law,"
whether passed by the state, local, or federal government.47 Chae Chan Ping
and Fong Yue Ting make clear that Congress can directly set the terms of a
non-citizen's immigration contract on virtually any grounds, even on racial
grounds the Court would not condone at the municipal level in Yick Wo. 48
After the creation of the plenary power doctrine through Chae Chan
Ping and its progeny, Congress took full advantage of this new-found
strength by passing many laws restricting immigration. These restrictions
ranged from the exclusion of the "pauper" and the polygamist, to the expul-
sion of the Asian and the "anarchist."49 Notable among these was the Na-
tional Origins Quota system established in 1924, which pegged permissible
immigration to two percent of the number of persons from that country as
reflected in the census.5 ° While facially neutral, the quota operated as a bar
to Asian migration,5 following on the heels of the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882 and the 1917 establishment of an "Asiatic barred zone. 52
The 1950s saw another period of nativistic sentiment, this time high-
lighting ideology rather than race as a legitimate ground for discriminating
against non-citizens. Following World War II and the advent of the Cold
War, Congress and the President turned to a stricter enforcement of ideologi-
cal bases for excluding and deporting non-citizens, supported in their efforts
by the United States Supreme Court. 3 Just as it did in Chae Chan Ping and
Fong Yue Ting, the Court would not stand in the way of the federal legisla-
45. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731; Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 610-11. See also
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
46. YickWo, 118 U.S. at 363.
47. See Romero, supra note 18, at 8.
48. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 367-68.
49. See Act of 1903, ch. 1012, § 39, 32 Stat. 1213, 1222 (amended by Act of Oct. 16,
1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (repealed 1952)); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22
Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). See also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 608.
50. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
51. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 3 (7th ed. 2000).
52. See Chinese Exclusion Act ch. 126; Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 2, 39 Stat.
874, 876 (amended 1952).
53. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210, 216 (1952).
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ture's and executive's decisions to privilege democracy over communism,
despite the negative impact upon longtime residents of the United States.
54
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,55 for instance, the Court
upheld the four year detention of Ignatz Mezei on Ellis Island following his
return from visiting his dying mother in Romania.5 6 Because immigration
officials were concerned that Mezei, a twenty-five-year non-citizen resident
of the United States, had spent nineteen months "behind the Iron Curtain,"
the Court deferred to Congress's and the executive's judgment that his deten-
tion without charge was a national security concern.57 It did so without spe-
cific proof of why Mezei was a threat to the nation; the Court simply ac-
cepted the political branches' representations that he was one.58 Like in the
Chinese Exclusion Act cases, the Court believed its proper role was to defer
to the reasoned judgment of the other two federal branches, even without
specific proof that the individual non-citizens-all longtime guests of the
nation-had violated the terms of their stay in the United States.59
In addition to the more stringent emphasis on ideological concerns,
Congress and the Executive continued their promulgation and enforcement
of racially discriminatory immigration policies, though this time, a bit more
subtly. In 1952, Congress passed the McCarren-Walter Act, a comprehen-
sive immigration bill that forms the framework of modern United States im-
migration law today, but included within it a more restrictive version of the
National Origins Quota system and established a new special racial quota for
Asians. 60 The Attorney General also repatriated 1.3 million Mexicans-and,
it turns out, Mexican-Americans--during the infamous "Operation Wet-
back," designed to combat undocumented migration.61
It may be argued that the plenary power doctrine should be divorced
from its racist origins because it possesses independent value-the doctrine
54. Seeid. at216.
55. Id. at 206.
56. Id. at 208, 216.
57. Id. at 214, 216.
58. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 214-15.
59. See id. at 214, 216.
60. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 177 (1952).
61. KEvN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
29 (2003). Some commentators have argued that the historical discrimination on race and
ideological grounds merely mirrored the domestic discrimination citizens suffered as well.
See, e.g., id. at 13; Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology
and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257 (2000). Per this view, minority citizens-whether on account of race,
gender, or sexual orientation-received few protections by the United States government; it
should be no surprise then that non-citizens in the same groups also suffered accordingly. See
Chin, supra, at 257-58.
20081
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properly places immigration law within the political realm, outside the pur-
view of unelected federal judges. As the political climate changes, the laws
change through amended legislation, not by judicial fiat. Indeed, several
Congressional initiatives have corrected the sins of the past, including the
1965 abolition of the National Origins Quota system 62-which has led to a
large influx of Asian immigration-and the passing of the Refugee Act of
1980,63 the beneficiaries of which have been largely from Communist re-
gimes.'
But the near total deference afforded the political branches through the
plenary power doctrine may come at a high price to human rights. This
question of how to balance the role of the federal courts as a check against
the executive and the legislature is of particular concern to many non-citizens
post 9/11. Moreover, as de facto "first responders," what role do states and
local governments play in a regime in which the Constitution confers immi-
gration power exclusively upon the federal government?
While the Court has consistently affirmed the original plenary power
doctrine born of the Chinese Exclusion Act cases, it has also developed two
other themes in an attempt to carve out a role for itself and the states in the
immigration policy debate. First, the Court recognizes it has the authority to
tell Congress when it has gone too far in imposing conditions upon the non-
citizen that violate her basic rights as an individual.65 It has done so subtly,
either by requiring Congress and the executive to provide for constitutional
due process safeguards, or by reading statutes and regulations broadly so as
to protect non-citizens from arbitrary treatment.66 Second, the Court has
held that states have only a limited role in regulating the activity of non-
citizens under so-called "alienage law.",67 While states are free to place lim-
its on the activities of non-citizens that go to the heart of state governance,
they may not enact legislation that discriminates against non-citizens in their
eligibility for public benefits as an alternative to directly preventing them
from settling into their state.68
Landon v. Plasencia69 is one prominent example of the Court requiring
the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to provide a non-
62. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911.
63. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
64. See Michael J. Churgin, Mass Exoduses: The Response of the United States, 30 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. (SPECIAL ISSuE) 310,317 (1996).
65. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).
66. See generally Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005).
67. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84.
68. See id. at 84 n.25.
69. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
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citizen with a hearing in accord with the Constitution's due process clause.7"
Salvadoran national Maria Plasencia, a lawful permanent resident for five
years, had left the United States for a brief, two-day visit to Mexico.7 Upon
her re-entry, federal authorities charged her with smuggling undocumented
persons into the United States knowingly and "for gain."72 An immigration
judge summarily excluded Plasencia from entry after an expedited hearing at
which she would ordinarily have been entitled to free legal counsel under
then existing rules.73 Because of her limited English, however, she had un-
knowingly waived her right to such assistance.74 The "for gain" portion of
the charge also bespeaks injustice and careless prosecuting. 75 While the evi-
dence suggested that she provided a ride to undocumented individuals whom
she met in Tijuana, it is unclear whether Plasencia knew that they were un-
documented and even less clear whether she had received any money for
transporting them. 76 Nonetheless, the immigration judge found her exclud-
able, which would have required her separation from both her United States
citizen husband and children.77 The United States Supreme Court vacated
the immigration judge's order, suggesting that Plasencia may not have been
given due process in light of her substantial connections to the United States:
"Plasencia's interest here is, without question, a weighty one. She stands to
lose the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.' Further,
she may lose the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high
among the interests of the individual.,
78
In reviewing "alienage law"-the law affecting non-citizens in the
United States aside and apart from the entry and exit rules of immigration
law-courts subject federal legislation to a "rational basis" test that has only
occasionally resulted in invalidating discriminatory legislation.79 Under such
review, the Court will generally defer to the government's reasons for enact-
ing legislation if these appear reasonable.8" However, if the Court believes
70. Id. at 32.
71. Id. at 23.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 24-25, 36.
74. Landon, 459 U.S. at 36. These facts are described more fully in Kevin Johnson's
description of the case. IMMIGRATION STORIES 223-25 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck
eds., 2005).
75. Landon, 459 U.S. at 39-40 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. See id. at 40 n.5.
77. See id. at 23, 34 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 34 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)) (citation omitted).
79. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 73 (1976).
80. A good example of a deferential application of rational basis review appears in Ma-
thews v. Diaz. Id. at 83. Lawful permanent residents (LPR)-so-called "green card" hold-
ers-had challenged federal Medicare rules that only allowed for supplemental insurance
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that the federal government has unfairly singled out non-citizens for unfa-
vorable treatment, it will strike down legislation even under the deferential
rational basis standard.8'
Aside from directly invoking procedural due process protections, as in
Landon, or employing a more stringent rational basis review, the Court has
also interpreted immigration statutes broadly to protect non-citizens from
government overreaching. In Zadvydas v. Davis,8" the Court ruled that au-
thorities could not hold a lawful permanent resident indefinitely, pending the
government's efforts to deport him.83 Following a finding that Zadvydas
was deportable for having committed certain crimes, the government had
sought to remove him, but could find no country willing to accept him; it
therefore argued that it could detain Zadvydas indefinitely until it could ef-
fect his deportation, citing the 1953 Mezei case discussed earlier.84 The gov-
ernment reasoned that if it could hold Mezei, a returning lawful permanent
resident indefinitely at Ellis Island on national security grounds, then it could
also hold Zadvydas, because his criminal conduct vitiated his right to remain
in the United States.85 The Court rejected this argument, finding that Con-
gress intended to place a limit of reasonableness on a deportee's length of
detention pending deportation.86 Concerned that a statute authorizing the
indefinite detention of non-citizens would raise serious due process prob-
lems, the Court imposed a presumption of unconstitutionality to any period
of confinement exceeding six months. 87
benefits to those who had been in the country for at least five years. Id. at 70 n. 1. Applying a
deferential rational basis review, the Court held that it was reasonable for Congress to condi-
tion receipt of these federal benefits on the length of an LPR's stay, noting that those who had
been in the United States longer may have stronger ties to the nation. Id. at 83.
81. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976). Hampton stands as an
example of when the rational basis review may be used to strike down laws that irrationally
discriminate against non-citizens. See id. Lawful permanent residents challenged United
States Civil Service Commission regulations excluding all non-citizens from occupying fed-
eral civil service jobs, limiting such occupations to United States "citizens and natives of
American Samoa." Id. at 90. Applying what appeared to be a more stringent version of the
rational basis test than in Mathews, the Court ruled that the government's desire for adminis-
trative convenience did not outweigh lawful non-citizens' rights to be considered on the same
footing as United States citizens for such jobs. See id. at 115-16.
82. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
83. Id. at 689, 699-700.
84. Id. at 684, 692. This consolidated case also involved a second criminal non-citizen,
Ma, whom no other country would accept. Id. at 685.
85. Id. at 692.
86. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
87. Id. at 701.
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In 2005, the Court extended the holding of Zadvydas regarding deport-
able non-citizens to excludable non-citizens as well, thereby effectively lim-
iting Mezei's reach.88 Clark v. Martinez89 had its origins in the Mariel boat-
lift twenty-five years earlier.90 Embarking from the port of Mariel, approxi-
mately 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States as refugees in 1980;
most of these "Marielitos" had relatives in the United States whom they re-
joined, eventually becoming lawful permanent residents. 9' However, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had identified about 2000 in-
dividuals as being risks to public safety either because they had committed
serious crimes or had suffered from severe mental illnesses that rendered
them dangerous to others. 92 Under immigration law, it was as if these per-
sons had never arrived; like Chae Chan Ping and Mezei before them, the
Cubans would not be permitted to legally and formally enter the United
States because of the danger they posed to the public-in technical parlance,
they were "inadmissible."93 Cuba would not accept them back, but because
of the threat they posed to safety, the INS was also unwilling to release them
from detention, opting instead to temporarily "parole" them pending their
removal.94 Unfortunately, many of those released committed crimes,
prompting the government to re-detain them.95
At issue in Clark v. Martinez was whether Mezei allowed the govern-
ment to indefinitely detain these otherwise excludable Cubans, or whether
the logic of Zadvydas placed reasonable limits on the government's detention
power.96 The Court chose to extend Zadvydas to cover the inadmissible Cu-
bans, holding that it was Congress's presumptive intent that all non-citizens,
regardless of status-whether deportable or inadmissible-should not be
detained for more than six months pending their removal.97 Undergirding
this opinion was the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which the
Court in both Clark and Zadvydas saw as the basis for reading Congress's
intent in favor of the non-citizens, thereby limiting the government's power
over them.98
88. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 379 (2005).
89. Id. at 371.
90. Id. at 374.
91. See Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th Cir. 1982).
92. See id. at 101, 102-03 n.2.
93. Clark, 543 U.S. at 375 n.2.
94. See Palma, 676 F.2d at 101-02.
95. See id. at 101.
96. Clark, 543 U.S. at 378-79.
97. Id. at 386.
98. See id. at 380; Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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In contrast to the general deference accorded Congress in formulating
policies affecting non-citizens, both within and outside the immigration
rules, the Court has more stringently reviewed state laws, holding that states
have only a limited role in regulating the activity of non-citizens under alie-
nage law. In Graham v. Richardson,99 the Court applied a more searching
"strict scrutiny" test to root out invidious state discrimination against non-
citizens.' 00 In Graham, the Court invalidated state welfare laws, which con-
tained citizenship and durational residency requirements that unfairly dis-
criminated against non-citizens.1 The reason for the difference in the
Court's treatment of the two sets of law stems from its view of the proper
role of the federal and state governments vis-A-vis non-citizens.02 Because
Congress enjoys plenary power over immigration policy, it makes sense that
Congress should also enjoy some leeway in other federal laws it passes that
affect non-citizens during their visit. States, on the other hand, have no
power to grant United States citizenship under our Constitution, nor do they
have a say in who gets to enter and who has to leave. '03 Immigration law is a
federal matter, and so if a state decides that it wants to indirectly influence a
non-citizen's residential choices by passing restrictive state laws, the Court
will examine those with a keen eye to ensure that some higher, more impor-
tant governmental objective is present than simply the desire to conserve
resources for United States citizens and lawful permanent residents first. "
Given that governments often use national origin as a proxy for racial
discrimination-think of both the Japanese internment and the post-9/ 11
profiling of Muslims and Arabs-the Court holds states more accountable
than the federal government for laws adversely affecting their non-citizen
populations.0 5 The stricter scrutiny applied to state action has led to the
invalidation of a host of laws, from citizenship limitations on the ability to
99. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
100. Id. at 376.
101. Id. The main difference between Graham-a state benefits law case-and Ma-
thews-a federal benefits case-appears to be the degree to which the Court was willing to
substitute its judgment for the Legislature's. See generally Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-
85 (1976). While in Graham, the Court was willing to second-guess the legislature, in Ma-
thews, it wasn't. Id. Hence, it is unsurprising that in Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck
down an anti-non-citizen state civil service rule similar to the federal one in Hampton. 413
U.S. 634, 646-47 (1973).
102. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376-77.
103. Id. at 382.
104. See id, at 378-79.
105. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22, 724 (1973).
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practice law0 6 to the ineligibility for financial aid for college based on alie-
nage. 
07
The Court has even protected undocumented immigrant children from
state discrimination, applying a slightly less severe standard than strict scru-
tiny. 0 8 In Plyler v. Doe,"9 the Court struck down a Texas law that denied
free public education to elementary and secondary school children of un-
documented immigrants."0 Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Justice Brennan
applied what appeared to be an intermediate level of scrutiny, reasoning that
because these innocent children were brought by their parents to this country,
denying them the right to an education would impose a grave disability and
create a permanent underclass of uneducated children. "'
If we have learned one thing from this brief tour of the nature and his-
tory of United States immigration law and policy, it is that Congress is the
main governmental entity responsible for changes in America's contract with
non-citizens. While that law may at times appear to be protective of human
rights and dignity (in its refugee and amnesty laws, for instance), and at other
times draconian and uncaring (in its denial of judicial review or its expedited
deportation procedures), one should appreciate it for what it is-a list of
rules governing the conditions under which non-citizens may enter and must
leave the United States. It is more like a contract than a human rights docu-
ment, and, in our country, Congress has the near exclusive power to define
the terms of that contract.
To see this, we need only review one recent United States Supreme
Court pronouncement on the rights of non-citizens under federal immigration
law and policy-a decision that reflects the judiciary's continued deference
to congressional plenary power. In Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales,'12 Mexi-
106. Id. at 724.
107. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1977).
108. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220, 230 (1982).
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id. at230.
111. Id. at 220, 230. Despite the Court's preference for strict review, in one class of cases
the Court has deferred to state alienage laws, sometimes called the "public function" excep-
tion. See, e.g., Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional
Community, 81 IOWA L. REv. 707, 736-37 (1996) (describing the "public function" excep-
tion). In Bernal v. Fainter, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to state alienage classifi-
cations "that exclude [non-citizens] from positions intimately related to the process of democ-
ratic self-government." 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984). Hence, in Foley v. Connelie, the Court
upheld a New York state law limiting police officer jobs to United States citizens only, rea-
soning that police are vested with a great deal of discretionary power to maintain law and
order-power that, in the state's view, should not be given to non-citizens over citizens. 435
U.S. 291, 298-300 (1978).
112. 126 S. Ct. 2422 (2006).
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can national, Humberto Fernandez-Vargas, first entered the United States in
the 1970s and was deported for immigration violations several times, but
each time he returned illegally to the United States."13 His final illegal reen-
try occurred in 1982, and, for approximately twenty years thereafter, he re-
mained undetected." 4 His life, however, had taken a turn for the better when
he started his own trucking business in Utah, bore a United States citizen son
and, in 2001, married the son's mother, his longtime girlfriend, who is also a
United States citizen. 5 When his wife petitioned for his adjustment to LPR
status in 2001, the federal government reinstated his 1981 deportation order,
denied his application for status adjustment, and deported him to Mexico in
2004.116
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the gov-
ernment acted lawfully in resurrecting his now twenty-year-old deportation
order pursuant to a federal law that had not been enacted until many years
after he had returned to the United States and became a productive member
of the community." 7 In an 8-to-i decision, the Court interpreted the 1996
law, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, in
the government's favor, upholding their reinstatement of the deportation
order and his subsequent removal to Mexico." 8 One might argue that Fer-
nandez-Vargas should not have benefited from his ability to evade the au-
thorities for twenty years; yet, one can easily imagine a judge weighing the
equities in this case of a reformed man whose deportation would have devas-
tating consequences for his U.S. citizen child and spouse.
Fernandez- Vargas stands as but the latest in a string of United States
Supreme Court cases that underscore the plenary power of Congress over
immigration matters, and lends support to the idea that immigration law is
more like contract law than human rights law. 1 9 Fernandez-Vargas violated
the terms of his contract with the United States and was held responsible for
his breach; a human rights version of immigration law might have insisted on
an impartial arbiter's review of the government's interest in maintaining or-
der, balanced against the non-citizen's reformation. 
20
We have also learned that states have less of a role to play in enforcing
or enacting immigration law than does the federal government, although we
113. Id. at 2427.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Fernandez- Vargas, 126 S. Ct at 2425.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 2422-34.
120. Id. at 2233-34.
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are likely to see more state and local governments seek to find ways to ad-
dress immigration issues. The reality is that state and local authorities have
exhibited growing frustration with the federal government's response to im-
migration issues, especially with respect to the undocumented.
At an estimated twelve million and counting,121 some believe the un-
documented have a significant impact in a handful of states and localities,
and among the poor and lower classes; in terms of competition for jobs,
many have become disillusioned by the perennial underfunding of immigra-
tion initiatives and the perceived lax federal approach to immigration en-
forcement. Yet, others acknowledge that the undocumented form the back-
bone of a significant number of industries, from farming to construction to
textiles, so that the mass deportation of all undocumented persons, even if
feasible, would severely damage these businesses and the national economy.
It will be interesting to see whether state and local governments will
gain a greater ability to enforce immigration laws in the future. 1 2 As states'
roles in immigration enforcement increase and the federal government's role
correspondingly wanes, scholars and pundits alike will pay close attention to
the United States Supreme Court's response to this paradigm shift. Whether
the Court will hold on to its traditional skepticism of state actions against
non-citizens or begin to defer to such initiatives as emanating from valid
Congressional mandates, only time will tell.
121. Muzaffar A. Chishti, Enforcing Immigration Rules: Making the Right Choices, 10
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 451,451 (2006-2007).
122. For a collection of thoughtful essays on this issue, see Symposium, Migration Regu-
lation Goes Local: The Role of States in U.S. Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 283 (2002), especially Wishnie, supra note 1.
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